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VI 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
a. The error of dismissing Big Ditch Irrigation Company's ("Big Ditch") antitrust 
counterclaim against Salt Lake City ("SLC") by applying a municipal status statutory defense, 
and by considering the wrong counterclaim (the original counterclaim had already been 
amended). Grant of a motion to dismiss is reviewed for correctness.1 This issue was 
preserved below at R. 105-28, 202-16, and 251-65. 
b. The error of dismissing Big Ditch's antitrust counterclaim against SLC without 
leave to amend. While discretionary, dismissals with prejudice without leave to amend are 
disfavored.2 Relatedly, whether the district court erred in denying Big Ditch's motion to 
amend its pleadings to rehabilitate the antitrust counterclaim. The legal standard governing a 
district court's discretion is reviewed for correctness.3 This issue was preserved below at R. 
105-28 and 1109-69. 
c. The error, on summary judgment, of ruling that an integrated contract 
transferred title to SLC despite contrary contractual language and contrary conduct by SLC. 
Relatedly, the error of ruling that the same water exchange contract vested Big Ditch with no 
entitlement to the use of water sufficient to file water change applications. Relatedly, whether 
1
 Whipple v. Am. Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996). 
2
 Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 1993). 
3
 Whipple v. Am. Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218,1220 (Utah 1996); Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 
1999 UT 36, f 17, 977 P.2d 1201. 
1 
the district court erred by failing to review the plenary record in its denial of the motion as 
required by Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. Proc. The proper legal standards governing a decision 
are reviewed for correctness,4 as are decisions construing the meaning of a contract5 and 
interpretations of decisions of the Utah Supreme Court6 and statutes.7 This issue was 
preserved below at R. 461-76, 4034 and 5393-5912. 
d. The error of denying a motion to reconsider on whether title had been 
conveyed to SLC. Abuse of discretion is the standard of review governing the denial of a 
motion to reconsider.8 This issue was preserved below at R. 4019-4395. 
e. The error of concluding that exchange contract water users may be implicidy 
restricted in their water use by straight-line geographic, not hydrologic, boundaries, to one 
particular use (irrigation), in perpetuity. The legal standards by which a district court makes 
its decisions are reviewed for correctness.9 This issue was preserved below at R. 5393-5912. 
£ The error of accepting two conclusory expert affidavits from SLC, refusing to 
admit two rebuttal expert affidavits submitted by Big Ditch, and refusing the affidavit of Big 
Ditch's president. An evidentiary decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion, except 
AWilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
*Aquagen Int'lv. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411, 413 (Utah 1998). 
64447Assocs. v. First Sec. Fin., 1999 UT App 13, If 9, 973 P.2d 992. 
7Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36,% 17, 977 P.2d 1201; Whipple v. Am. Fork Irrigation Co., 
910 P.2d 1218,1220 (Utah 1996). 
*Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381,1387 (Utah 1996); Whipple v. Am. Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 
1218, 1220 (Utah 1996). 
'Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
2 
correctness is used when considering the legal basis for such a decision.10 This issue was 
preserved below at R. 398-407, 5357-65, 3186-88, 3917-18 and 1031-42. 
g. The error of ignoring factual disputes concerning estoppel and modification in 
granting SLC's final motion for summary judgment, including resolving the inherently factual 
issue of reasonability. Summary judgment allows no material disputes of fact.11 If a grant of 
summary judgment necessarily resolved factual issues, even implicitly, the district court has 
conducted a factual review and has made factual findings, which is error.12 This issue was 
preserved below at R. 5402, 5421. 
h. The error of denying summary judgment to Big Ditch when no set of facts 
showed the required elements of estoppel, modification or a defense to the statute of frauds. 
Denial of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness.13 This issue was preserved below at 
R. 5393-5912. 
DISPOSITIVE AUTHORITIES 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3-3 and -3.5 are attached in the Addendum, together with 
other relevant authority. 
^Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, 1999 UT App 80, \ 8, 977 P.2d 508; Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130, 
1134 (Utah CtApp . 1990). 
nMastv. Oversow 971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
nWestern Water, LLC v. Olds, 2008 UT 18, U 14,184 P.3d 578. 
"Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, % 6, 177 P.3d 600. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from the denial and grant of multiple motions 
for summary judgment in a civil case. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
Substantive Rulings. SLC commenced this case by filing a complaint against Big 
Ditch and four Big Ditch shareholders, Garside, Litke, Downs and J L.C.14 R. 1. SLC and 
Big Ditch had executed a water exchange contract in 1905. The complaint alleged that Big 
Ditch had wrongfully filed change applications on its contract water; that, as the water's 
owner, SLC could veto any change application; and that Big Ditch and J L.C. had slandered 
SLC's title by filing the change applications. 
Big Ditch and the shareholders filed an answer and counterclaim. R. 69. The 
counterclaim alleged, inter alia, breach of contract and antitrust violations based on SLC's 
disproportionate and illegal role as a water market player. SLC filed a motion to dismiss the 
antitrust counterclaim. R. 100. The district court granted SLC's motion, but not before the 
shareholders had dropped their claims, and Big Ditch had amended its counterclaim as a 
matter of right to address SLC's arguments.15 SLC responded to the amended answer and 
counterclaims six weeks after they were filed. R. 343. 
Big Ditch filed a motion for partial summary judgment that its contract water right 
was fixed based on creek flow (the "fixed quantity motion"). R. 220. Big Ditch argued that 
14Downs was subsequently dismissed. 
15
 The shareholders and Big Ditch took further action to dismiss the shareholders and reinstate 
the antitrust counterclaim. Since these efforts concern the shareholders, they are treated in the 
shareholders' brief, incorporated here by reference. 
4 
the diminishment claims were not supported by the contract, but rather it unambiguously 
promised a fixed proportionate quantity of water to Big Ditch. 
SLC filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on its first two causes of action 
(SLC's "title" motion). R. 288. It argued that its delivery obligations were based on irrigable 
acreage in the Big Ditch service area, and relied on extrinsic evidence supporting diminution. 
It also argued the contract transferred title to SLC of all the contract water, on both sides of 
the exchange. Big Ditch countered that the contract was unambiguous and its plain meaning 
controlled, and that, if Big Ditch did not retain title, it still had the right to file change 
applications on its contract water. 
SLC's title claim was a modern reversal of position. Accordingly, Big Ditch filed on 
April 7, 2008, another motion for partial summary judgment contrasting SLC's current and 
historical positions (Big Ditch's "title motion"). R. 2606. Big Ditch's title motion thus fit 
within the scope of its fixed quantity motions and SLC's title motion, R. 1378-79 fn. 1, and 
raised factual issues with SLC's motion. 
The district court declined to hear argument on these three related motions together, 
even though oral argument on the first two motions was set four months after the third 
related motion was filed. This was despite Big Ditch's contention that the evidence in Big 
Ditch's title motion created factual issues over SLC's title argument, disputes evidenced by a 
plenary record review. R. 4034. 
The district court did not mention Big Ditch's title motion in its ruling granting in 
part Big Ditch's fixed quantity motion and granting SLC's title motion. R. 3349. The district 
5 
court ruled that SLC had title to water on both sides of the exchange. Yet it also ruled that 
Big Ditch had a right to a fixed quantity of water under the contract, which it deemed 
unambiguous and integrated, with no limitation on nature or place of use. The district court 
reserved for trial whether there were equitable theories such as estoppel or modification that 
might reduce SLC's delivery obligation. 
The district court's failure to acknowledge the pendency of Big Ditch's title motion 
and its factual issues prompted Big Ditch to file a motion to reconsider the decision granting 
title to SLC. R. 4016. While analytically linked, the district court de-linked Big Ditch's title 
motion and the motion to reconsider, denied them separately, R. 4833, 5260, and cited the 
analytical gaps created by their dissociation to deny them.16 
On December 24, 2008, Big Ditch accepted arguendo facts SLC had adduced to 
substantiate its equitable theories, and moved for summary judgment, contending that those 
facts did not meet SLC's burden. R. 5387. SLC cross-moved on the same facts, R. 5985, 
and in responding to the cross-motion Big Ditch raised factual disputes, R. 5402, 5421, and 
challenged the facts' admissibility. R. 5355. The district court granted SLC's motion, R. 
6339, reversing its decision of August 22, 2008 by placing nature and use restrictions on Big 
Ditch's entitlement to the use of water under the contract. It also ruled that Big Ditch could 
not file change applications on its contractual water entitlement. 
16Big Ditch argued either that the exchange contract was an exchange of usufructs or, 
alternatively, an exchange of title. The intervening ruling vesting SLC with title prompted Big 
Ditch to pursue the exchange of title argument, which it now acknowledges this Court need not 
necessarily reach: entitlement, not title, is the issue. The district court rejected this argument. 
R. 4833. Big Ditch filed a motion to reconsider the district court's denial of Big Ditch's title 
motion on September 22, 2008, R. 4010, which was denied. R. 5260. 
6 
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings. SLC supported its tide motion with an affidavit 
of Jeffry Niermeyer, SLC's director of public utilities. R. 349. Big Ditch moved to strike this 
affidavit as argumentative and legally conclusory, particularly with respect to the contractual 
intent of the parties. 408, 477 This motion was denied. R. 2945. 
Big Ditch submitted the affidavit of the president of Big Ditch, James Garside R. 481, 
(also a party) to counter SLC's title motion for summary judgment. In order to rebut the 
argument that SLC would be harmed by honoring the 1905 contract, the affidavit 
documented SLC's surplus water supply. The district court struck the affidavit, stating that it 
dealt with antitrust issues (despite that the affidavit was offered solely on SLC's claims of 
harm). The district court struck only a portion of the Garside affidavit, but did not specify 
which portion. R. 2945. 
On July 3, 2008, Big Ditch filed the affidavit of its expert, Ronald K. Christensen, 
Ph.D., and sought permission to file the affidavit despite the close of briefing on pending 
summary judgment motions. R. 3184. Oral argument on two of the motions had been set 
three weeks later, July 22, 2008. R. 3258. The affidavit rebutted the affidavit of Mr. 
Niermeyer, discussed the nature of Big Ditch's title to its water, and supported Big Ditch's 
fixed quantity and title motions. On September 11, 2008, Big Ditch filed a supplemental 
affidavit of Mr. Christensen reflecting his further investigation, with another motion seeking 
permission to file. R. 3373. The district court denied Big Ditch permission to file the first 
affidavit17 R. 4833. 
17The district court did not address the September 11 affidavit. 
7 
On December 4, 2008, SLC filed a second affidavit of Mr. Niermeyer, R. 5308. Big 
Ditch filed a motion in limine to exclude this affidavit, R. 5355, arguing that it was legally 
conclusory. The district court denied the motion. R. 6324. Finally, the district court 
overruled Big Ditch's objection to the final order, R. 6349, prepared by SLC. R. 6357. 
C. Statement of Facts. In 1905 Big Ditch and SLC entered into a water exchange 
contract. R. 19. Big Ditch transferred to SLC the right to divert and use the water it had 
been taking from Big Cottonwood Creek. In exchange, SLC would timely deliver a fixed 
amount of water to Big Ditch, tied to the measured flow in the creek. The exchange gave 
SLC high quality canyon water and gave Big Ditch a flow of water at Big Ditch's diversion 
point from sources of SLC's choosing. For the next thirty years SLC executed 31 other 
similar exchange contracts with other companies. R. 5310. 
In 1914, The Progress Co. v. Salt Yjike City, Civil No. 8921, adjudicated a dispute 
between SLC and the Progress Company. The decision fixed the amount of water SLC (on 
behalf of Big Ditch) could divert from the creek, and in turn recognized that SLC could take 
this water "by virtue o f the 1905 contract. R. 28. 
In the intervening decades, SLC either never claimed or eschewed tide to Big Ditch's 
contract water. R. 1383-92. During this time Big Ditch's service area gradually urbanized, 
and, while SLC continued to deliver Big Ditch's full contractual amount through the 
diversion structure, Big Ditch turned less water into its conduit. SLC also acquired water 
rights exceeding its contemporary or projected needs and leased these as "surplus." R. 6302. 
It also engaged in aggressive practices to control and eventually eliminate its exchange 
8 
partners, R. 2595, 4274-75, characterizing other water users as "dangerous" and "sinister" 
who would need to respond to SLCs "muscle." R. 6289-90. 
In 2006 Big Ditch filed a number of administrative change applications to change 
points of diversion of its exchange water. SLC protested and then, in 2007, sued Big Ditch 
and various Big Ditch shareholders for filing the change applications. SLC claimed that Big 
Ditch had no residual entitlement to file such applications.18 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court ruled that the 1905 exchange contract and a 1914 court ruling 
granted water title to SLC, on both sides of the exchange. This left Big Ditch with no 
residual entitlement to the use of water, and barred Big Ditch from filing change 
applications. This conclusion presupposed arbitrary contractual restrictions on place and 
nature of use. It also ignored SLCs own historical conduct and the express language of the 
contract. 
The district court erred in finding that equity had reduced Big Ditch's contractual 
share, either through estoppel or modification. Disputed factual issues made summary 
judgment improper. 
The district court erred by dismissing Big Ditch's antitrust counterclaim by (1) ruling 
on the wrong counterclaim; (2) failing to discern in the allegations cognizable antitrust 
violations, including SLCs aggressive efforts to drive its exchange partners (such as Big 
Ditch) from the water market; and (3) granting SLC antitrust immunity when SLC banks 
18The balance of the facts are in the Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
9 
water and sells it as surplus as a market participant. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction. Sagebrush and cottonwood trees. This was likely the 1846 landscape 
dominating the site of the Matheson Courthouse. Later, it was transformed into farmland, 
and then into an urban, perhaps even industrial landscape, until today, where upon it sits a 
modern building with indoor plumbing. 
It would be trite to say that water made this all possible. And only partially 
true. Water development made it possible. Flexible, transferrable, elastic water development. 
Water development not bound by arbitrary straight lines or oppressive regulation and 
restriction. 
SLC and Big Ditch signed an exchange contract in 1905. It was a monument to 
flexible water development, allowing each party to use the best water suited to it. But water 
needs change with time. Big Ditch has realized that its irrigation needs in Midvale are going 
away. Its exchange water should be used elsewhere, for the benefit of other 
development. Irrigation needs have dried up; time to move on. 
SLC defines "moving on" as death. The death of Big Ditch. This is the fate SLC 
foresees for all of its exchange partners, while SLC accrues far more water than it could ever 
need. SLC's efforts to kill Big Ditch are just a part of its strategy to dominate the valley water 
markets with unfair and illegal practices. 
Big Ditch has water that it wants to use beneficially, through access to the change 
application process. Such water "rezoning" is crucial to preserving beneficial use. SLC 
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would deny such change, a privilege that even sewer effluent enjoys. 
Big Ditch does not wish to go gently into the night SLC has prepared for it. Flexible 
water transfer, free from arbitrary restraint, and free from the illegal practices of a city doing 
far more than care for its citizens, is what Big Ditch seeks. Flexible transfer gives Big Ditch 
life, just as the cliche assigns water the same role to the Earth. 
I. BIG DITCH HAS A STATUTORY ENTITLEMENT TO USE WATER. 
At first, the district court correctly ruled that Big Ditch was entitled to a fixed 
delivery of water, and that its water use was not limited to irrigation or to its service area. It 
then reversed itself sub silentio. The district court also ruled that SLC had title to the contract 
water under Progress Company v. Salt hake Cit/9 and the 1905 contract, and thus Big Ditch 
could not file change applications on the contract water. The district court erred. As a 
beneficial user of the contract water, Big Ditch has the right to use it, irrespective of who 
owns technical title to the water. 
A. Big Ditch Has A Valuable Entitlement. 
Claiming "title" is a way to attack another's entitlement to the use of water.20 
However, entitlement, as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3, and not title, is what matters. 
Entitlement gives Big Ditch the right to file change applications. This Court need not reach 
whether Big Ditch (or SLC) received title to the contract water. "[Ojwnership of water is far 
19Civil No.8921 (D. Utah 1914). R. 24. 
20
 In East Jordan Irrigation Co. v. Morgan, 860 P.2d 310 (Utah 1993) , the irrigation company 
claimed title over the shareholder Payson City, and in Strawberry High Une Canal Co. v. Bureau of 
Reclamation, 2006 UT 19,133 P.3d 410, the Bureau of Reclamation claimed title to Strawberry 
water in derogation of the users' rights. 
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more complex than ownership of other forms of property, and the mere existence of legal 
tide does not determine all the rights of ownership. Indeed, even the term 'ownership' is an 
oversimplification."21 
This Court has already found that the 1905 exchange contract vested Big Ditch with a 
significant entitlement. In Ellerbeck v. Salt Lake City,22 SLC was challenged for issuing a bond 
underwriting that contract. The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a bond issued for 
an exchange, rather than a purchase. This Court raised sua sponte whether SLC was alienating 
water contrary to Section 6, Article 11 of the Utah Constitution.23 The parties' focus on 
what SLC was receiving triggered scrutiny of what SLC was giving away. 
SLC now contends that it conveyed no section 73-3-3 entitlement to Big Ditch in the 
1905 contract. Ellerbeck contradicts this contention. SLC did convey substantial value in the 
contract, otherwise Ellerbeck would not have engaged in its express constitutional analysis.24 
21
 East Jordan, 860 P.2d at 317 (Durham, J., dissenting). Big Ditch does not concede that SLC 
has title, since vesting title in SLC was unnecessary to adjudicate the rights of the parties. SLC 
did not plead quiet title in its complaint. Rather, it assumed it had title, and then sought to 
prevent Big Ditch from filing change applications. Complaint \ 36 (R. 10-11). The dismissal of 
the slander claim mooted the title issue. SLC argued, R. 1228, that this Court vested title in SLC 
in Progress Company v. Salt Lake City, 173 P. 705 (1918), cited in Salt Lake City v. SilverFork Pipeline 
Co., 2000 UT 3, 5 P.3d 1206. Progress did not do so, as discussed below, and Silver Fork's 
discussion of "title" was mere background to a dispute that had nothing to do with title. 
22
 29 Utah 361, 81 P. 273 (1905). 
23
 Neither party raised the issue. The briefs are attached in the Appellants' Addendum. 
24
 Ellerbeck went on to rule that since SLC received something of substantial value in exchange 
for the substantial value it conveyed away, the exchange was constitutional. 81 P. at 274. 
Perhaps Ellerbeck regarded the transfer from SLC as a transfer of actual title to the exchange 
water. The 1905 contract would then have effected a title-for-title exchange. While this may 
be a plausible reading of Ellerbeck, and one that Big Ditch would accept, it is not necessary for 
the Court to reach this issue. 
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This result is virtually identical with that of a later decision construing the Utah 
Constitution, Genola v. Santaquin^ where the Court held that a "perpetual and continuous" 
contract diversion right like that of Big Ditch amounts to, in all practicality, a water right. 
While Genola did not deal with "entitled to use" language, it is clear that the Genola Town's 
contractual right was deemed very valuable, even though it did not amount to title. 
The entitlement Big Ditch received, acknowledged by Ellerbeck, makes Big Ditch a 
beneficial user of the contract water, entitled to use it how it pleases once delivered. The 
State Engineer's practice avoids the "ownership" question altogether and focuses instead on 
the legislative language of "entitled to the use of . These statutory interpretations should be 
given deference by this Court.26 Entitlement, not ownership is dispositive, as a matter of 
legislative intent. 
B. The Contract Conveyed an Entitlement. 
The language of the fully integrated and unambiguous 1905 contract reflects a quid 
pro quo exchange of value.27 The contract provides: 
1. Big Ditch transfers its right to the use of its water to SLC (R. 19; ^ fl); 
25
 80 P.2d 930, 934-35(1938) 
26LPI v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, If 9, 215 P.3d 135. The State Engineer assigns water right numbers 
to contractual rights. R. 41,62 (Big Ditch change applications). The State Engineer is complying 
with the statutory "entitled to use" language and its statutory duty to administer water by 
recognizing the value of such entitlements. Entitlement, not title, arises throughout the code. 
For example, a right to the use of sewer effluent under contract (not title to the effluent) is the 
predicate to file effluent change applications, Utah Code Ann. § 73-3c-302, a practice SLC 
employs. R. 3471. See LPI, 2009 UT 41 at Tf 11 (statute to be construed in harmony with it 
constituent parts, including other chapters). 
27
 The district court was correct in ruling that the 1905 contract was a fully integrated and 
unambiguous document. R. 3353. 
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2. SLC agrees to "perpetually and continuously deliver" a continuous flow of water 
to Big Ditch, defined as a portion of the Big Cottonwood Creek flow. The water 
is to be suitable for the purposes of irrigation (R. 19; J^2); 
3. SLC agrees to "maintain all of the existing rights of [Big Ditch] to the waters and 
to the channel of said Big Cottonwood Creek, and to bring and defend, at the 
expense of [SLC] any and all suits for the purpose of maintaining said rights." (R. 
21; 118); 
4. SLC agrees that if it fails to deliver for 24 hours the "full quantity" of water it has 
promised, then Big Ditch may "retake" its right to creek water. If SLC fails to 
deliver the "full quantity" of water under the contract for a period of six months, 
the contract shall "terminate," and the parties rights shall revert to pre-contract 
status. (R. 21; f9) 
5. SLC agrees to keep the diversion structure in good order in case of reverter. (R. 
21; 17). 
"Exchange" is key. Through it, Big Ditch, like a traditional water right owner, is 
entided to a fixed amount of water, for no fee, from a specific diversion point, for its use. 
SLC delivers sufficient water for Big Ditch to take its fixed amount. Yet SLC claims tide to 
all of the contract water, a notion alien to "exchange." SLC's ultimate contention has 
insistendy been that it requires tide to the canyon water to divert it, and tide to the exchange 
water to control how it is delivered. SLC misses the mark. It may control how to convey 
and deliver the exchange water to Big Ditch, but cannot retain control over the water once it 
14 
reaches Big Ditch's diversion structure.28 Just as an appropriation fixes a diversion right for a 
tide owner, the contract allows SLC to take its water, and Big Ditch to take its water 
downstream. This relationship does not allow reaching along the stream anywhere to 
control Big Ditch.29 
SLC apparently figured that its claim to the legal artifice of "tide" would annihilate all 
of Big Ditch's control over its exchange water. This approach failed to consider that even a 
nonowner can be entitled to the use of water, and defeats the "exchange" intent behind the 
contract. 
SLC's argument misconstrues title. It focuses on molecules of water rather than the 
specific right to divert water. An entitlement to water is not about molecules of water. 
Rather, it is about control, defined by where, when, how and against whom the water is used. 
Big Ditch has, under the contract, the right to divert water through its diversion structure in 
a specific proportionate amount, at specific times, in a certain priority. Thus, Big Ditch's 
exchange right is really no different than an appropriator's right to a specific amount of 
water from a point of diversion, except SLC has the right to pour different sources of water 
into the creek to compensate for the water it takes from the creek upstream. This water may 
28Big Ditch takes its water passively from the creek via a control valve, which allows the desired 
amount of water from the creek into the Big Ditch system. R. 753. Because SLC has always had 
Big Ditch's full share available, R. 5499-5813, and has maintained water in reserve to perform 
the exchange agreements, R. 6064, its claim that "deliveries" have diminished, R. 6125, is untrue: 
it has always delivered the full amount. Big Ditch's calls have diminished, not SLC's deliveries. 
29
 SLC itself has in the past recognized that title is not dispositive of one's right to control water: 
R. 5855, 5891, 5894. As discussed in detail below, this Court has addressed control issues 
without the need to focus on title. See, e.g., Moyle v. Salt hake City, 50 Utah 357,167 P. 660, 662-
63 (Utah 1917)(exchange partner with SLC not limited to historical place of use in using 
exchange water; court did not address who had title). 
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come from Utah Lake, City wells, or even the creek water itself. No matter where the water 
comes from, however, Big Ditch's diversion right remains inviolate. Since molecules (creek 
molecules, Utah Lake molecules, well molecules) are the only factor distinguishing Big 
Ditch's exchange right from a pure appropriated right, Big Ditch's right to divert and place 
to beneficial use is intact. This is entitlement in its purest sense. 
C. Diminished Calls Did Not Change the Contract. 
To rebut Big Ditch's claims of entitlement, SLC claimed that Big Ditch's reduction in 
irrigation calls reflected a contractual intent of diminished delivery. Apart from having no 
basis in fact,30 SLC's interpretation of the parties' intent was initially rejected by the district 
court. It ruled that the contract was fully integrated and required delivery of a proportionate 
fixed amount of water. The contractual term "irrigation purposes" did not tie delivery to 
irrigable lands in the Big Ditch service area. "Irrigation purposes" was not a delimiter of 
covenants; rather, it described the parties' status. The district court further concluded that 
the agreement contained no nature or place of use limitations.31 
Reading an implied diminishment clause into the contract would violate strong Utah 
policy favoring flexible water development. Exchange contracts must be construed to foster 
30
 SLC has admitted, as shown in neutral uncontradicted commissioners' reports and through 
testimony of its own officials, that Big Ditch's "full share" has always been "available." R. 5417-
18,5499-5813,6064. 
31
 The district court ruled that SLC's interpretation would render paragraph 2 of the contract 
meaningless. R. 5159. 
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such development32 Restrictions on transferability, when imposed, are narrowly defined.33 
This Court's 100-year-old practice favoring flexible water development reflects that any 
restriction on the use of water, not needed to prevent direct prejudice to the restrictor, is 
suspect.34 Such suspicion is warranted here where one of the contracting parties did not 
bargain for a restriction,35 but instead now collaterally invokes it to make a claim to allot the 
water subject to the contract, on both sides of the exchange.36 Apart from defeating beneficial 
use, SLC's interpretation skews the water market in SLC's favor by impeding transferability. 
Contracts allowing implementation of disfavored policies should be strictly interpreted so as 
to diminish their effect.37 
In short, neither an exchange of title nor control is required to effect the agreement. 
SLC cites its initial control of molecules of water to control them forever. This is not 
32
 Mojle v. Salt "Lake City, 167 P. at 662 (contract to be interpreted so as to avoid waste and 
encourage beneficial use). 
33EastJordan, 860 P.2d at 315-16 (shareholders retain substantial protections even when deprived 
of right to file change applications); accord Strawberry, 2006 UT 19 at f 37 {East Jordan is a shield 
for shareholders, not a sword against them). 
34
 East Jordan, 860 P.2d at 315-16; Sjrett v. Tropic &E. Fork Irr. Co., 89 P.2d 474 (Utah 1939); 
Bairdv. Upper Canal Irr. Co., 70 Utah 57, 257 P. 1060 (1927). 
35
 See, e.g., Moyle, 167 P. at 662-63 (exchange contract silent as to place of use; court refuses to 
infer historic place of use as contractually required, citing in support need for flexible water 
development policy). 
36
 A change application on a share can be defeated only if the company can show prejudice 
resulting from the change. See Utah Code Ann. 73-3-3; see also East Jordan, 860 P.2d at 312-14. 
37Utah property law favors the free alienability of property. Redd v. Western Sav. <&Loan Co., 646 
P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1982). Contracts restraining the alienation of property are generally invalid 
unless meeting strict exceptions of reasonability. Redd, 646 P.2d at 766-67; see also Anderson v. 
Provo City, 2005 UT 5, f26,108 P.3d 701. 
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necessary to effect the exchange contract, does not reflect the parties' contractual intent, and 
violates the express language of the contract and Utah public policy. 
D. SLC Is Precluded by its Conduct from Denying That Big Ditch's 
Exchange Rights Are an Entitlement. 
The value of Big Ditch's entitlement is reflected in SLC's historically quiescent 
attitude toward it. The record from Progress v. Salt hake Citf* and other historical documents 
show that SLC never claimed, and actually eschewed, control over Big Ditch's exchange 
water until about 1993. 
The exchange contract arose out of SLC's need to secure water without funds. 
Exchange was the only way it could secure a reliable domestic supply. When SLC's exchange 
right was challenged by the Progress Company, SLC allied with its exchange partners to 
defend that right. SLC's legal positions in Progress now preclude it from taking a contrary 
position. SLC is similarly precluded, under theories of equitable and judicial estoppel, from 
departing from its historically consistent position that Big Ditch has an entitlement to use 
water. A fortiori, all of these theories bar SLC from claiming title to and/or control of all of 
the water subject to exchange. 
In 1904 SLC secured bond funds to pay for infrastructure and the capital to secure 
the right to use water from the mountains. SLC approved a resolution stating that SLC was 
not able to purchase Big Ditch's rights outright.39 SLC communicated to the public in open 
meetings and through this resolution that it was not seeking to acquire Big Ditch's water. R. 
38References to Progress in this section are to the district court proceedings. 
39
 R. 1379-80; 1457-65 (City in no position to purchase the farmers' water; an absolute exchange 
might be preferable, but this conditional one will do). 
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1379-81. SLC's litigation posture in Progress and Big Ditch's alliance with SLC therein also 
show how SLC consistently acknowledged the value of Big Ditch's water holdings. R. 1383-
89. SLC continued this approach in its appeal, and in subsequent litigation. R. 1389-92. 
Both the record and decree in Progress show that the Progress court did not interpret or 
construe the 1905 agreement. The court merely accepted it as a document that controlled 
the legal posture of the parties. Progress did not alter the contract's language. Indeed, Progress 
referred back to the contract, stating that SLC had "by virtue o f the contract acquired the 
right to use Big Ditch's water.40 
The decree must be consistent with the record that generated it. Accordingly, the 
Progress court accepted SLC's and Big Ditch's mutually agreed position in the pleadings and 
briefing that the exchange contract gave standing to SLC to contest the Progress Company's 
claims. SLC represented that the agreement gave SLC the right to use canyon water, but 
never claimed control over Big Ditch's contract exchange right. Given this position, Big 
Ditch argued below that SLC was equitably barred under the doctrines of issue preclusion, 
claim preclusion, judicial estoppel and equitable estoppel from making a claim of title to all 
of the water on both sides of the exchange, and, a fortiori, from claiming that Big Ditch's 
exchange water was not an entitlement. Since title to the exchange water was not at issue in 
Progress, the court's ultimate mandate could not encompass any grant of title.41 
40
 R. 28. Progress adjudicated allocations among the various parties, ratios that had up to that 
point been undefined. Since SLC's rights against the Progress Company were derivative of Big 
Ditch's, Big Ditch's rights logically needed to be defined by the court. 
41
 SLC argued below that Progress dispositively quieted title in SLC. This ignored the record and 
SLC's arguments in Progress. Nothing in Progress suggests that it intended to contravene or 
interpret the contract. The contract remains dispositive as to the exchange partners' rights, not 
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SLC has gone on record, in Progress and elsewhere, that it did not claim tide to the 
canyon water. These arguments were briefed voluminously below in Big Ditch's title motion 
for summary judgment, and need not be repeated here. R. 1398-1416.42 What does require 
scrutiny, however, is the district court's remarkable response. Rather than treat the 
arguments on their merits, it flady stated that its intervening tide decision had mooted them. 
R. 4834. A short while later, when considering Big Ditch's motion to reconsider the tide 
issue, the district court revisited the estoppel issue by concluding that by arguing estoppel 
Big Ditch was impermissibly attempting to adduce parol evidence, and was being 
inconsistent with its prior litigation posture. R. 5260. The district court erred in two critical 
respects. 
First, the preclusion and estoppel arguments do not construe the contract. Rather, 
they focus on SLC's conduct, which bars it from offering interpretations inconsistent with 
that conduct.43 Second, while the contract is integrated, negotiations before it was adopted 
are admissible to show its meaning, as is evidence that clarifies, but does not contradict or 
Progress. Moreover, even if Progress did construe the relationship between SLC and Big Ditch, 
it did not materially change E//erbeckys conclusion that Big Ditch received an entidement under 
the exchange. Were it somehow determined that the parties' representations in Progress (and the 
other representations SLC has made) meant that the parties exchanged tide, they still made an 
exchange. An exchange is what SLC claimed in Progress and what Big Ditch relied on in 
participating as it did with SLC in that case. 
42These arguments focused on exchange of usufruct versus exchange of title. The point was to 
show that SLC did not contractually gain absolute control of Big Ditch's entidement. 
43
 SLC seemed to have no difficulty branding Big Ditch's efforts to raise estoppel as violating 
the parol evidence rule while denying it was doing so through its own estoppel theories 
(discussed below). 
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vary from, the language of the contract44 
Here, the contract was unambiguous and integrated. The evidence concerning SLC's 
conduct both before and after the contract was executed is consistent with the agreement's 
express meaning, particularly the intent of the parties to effect an exchange. As for 
"inconsistencies," these were borne of the procedural accident that the district court did not 
consider Big Ditch's estoppel motion until after it had ruled on SLC's motion claiming title.45 
Big Ditch consistently argued that SLC was barred from claiming that Big Ditch did not have 
an entitlement, a position reflected by the contract's express language and SLC's historical 
litigation posture and conduct. 
Most important, SLC did not need control over the water in Big Ditch's ditch to effect 
the parties' contractual intent SLC did not, and cannot, show that its contractual benefits 
are impaired by Big Ditch retaining control of the water it receives.46 Big Ditch retains its 
contractual privilege to take its contract water at its diversion point, and then use it as it 
pleases.47 
44
 Restatement (2d) of Contracts § 214; Restatement (2d) of Contracts § 212. See, e.g., Cantamar, 
L.L.C.. v. Champagne, 2006 UT App 321, f ) , 142 P.3d 140. 
45
 This was despite Big Ditch's repeated requests that the court address all of the motions 
together and not seriatim. See, e.g., R. 1378-79 fn. 1. 
46
 Losing a windfall arising from nondelivery is not impairment of a contractual right. SLC's 
failure to show any harm is treated in detail below (discussion of impairment required for any 
finding of estoppel). 
47
 Irrespective of how title vests, Big Ditch received entitlement from the exchange. It is 
possible that SLC could have title to all of the exchange water while Big Ditch retains a residual 
entitlement to file change applications as an equitable owner of the exchange water. See 
Strawberry^ 2006 UT 19 (discussed below). Most logically, if SLC received title to the canyon 
water, Big Ditch should receive title to the contract water. When confronted with this argument 
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E. Big Ditch's Contract Diversion Right is the Type of Entitlement 
Granting The Right To File Change Applications. 
SLC argued below that any entitlement Big Ditch may have does not allow it to file 
change applications. Originally the district court rejected amount and place or nature of use 
restrictions on Big Ditch's entitlement, and then reversed itself. R. 6339. It ruled that such 
restrictions were implicit in the contract, and thus ultimately concluded that Big Ditch lacked 
sufficient control over its exchange right to qualify as one who is entitled to the use of water 
under section 73-3-3. 
The district court ruled: 
1. Big Ditch's exchange right did not amount to title. 
2. Only an "'appropriator' or owner" of the water right could rightfully invoke 
entitlement status under section 73-3-3. 
3. This Court has ruled that only an appropriator can file a change application. 
Accepting arguendo the first premise, the last two premises are erroneous. The district 
court collapsed entitlement with outright ownership It equated "appropriator" with 
"owner," and thus concluded that only an owner can file change applications. This vitiates 
section 73-3-3's entitlement language. 
below, the district court ruled that the 1905 contract, although an exchange, did not "elevate" 
Big Ditch's right to an outright conveyance of water. R. 4835 The reason why, it appeared, was 
SLC's ability to designate what water SLC delivers. This source-based analysis is erroneous. It 
ignores the fundamental attributes of ownership still imbued within Big Ditch's exchange right 
(discussed above). The district court ignored one of its precedents (Big Ditch's right was fixed) 
while embracing another (SLC had title). The "fixed amount" ruling was dispositive. No matter 
where the molecules of water came from, SLC had the obligation to deliver them in a fixed 
proportion, for subsequent use as Big Ditch pleased. 
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Section 73-3-3 uses its language purposively. When construing a statute, courts are to 
assign words their plain meaning.48 This Court's history of construing this language reflects 
that tide or appropriative status are not dispositive. 
The district court miscited East Jordan as requiring appropriator status to file change 
applications. East Jordan did not require one entided to the use of water to be either an 
owner or an appropriator. Rather, it avoided the question of a shareholder's appropriator 
status by ruling that even if the shareholder once had ownership status, it had conveyed it 
away by becoming part of the collective.49 East Jordan was more concerned with the 
contractual controls created by collectivization than title or appropriator status. As such, its 
holding was limited to the unique situation governing collectivization.50 
This Court has recognized for decades the rights equitable users of water retain, 
including the right to file change applications as one "entitled to the use of" water.51 Prisbrey 
v. Bloomington Water Co.,52 cited by the district court, is a continuation of that line. Prisbrey 
dealt not with the rights of one versus the whole, but rather with the temporal distinction 
4SLPI v. McGee, 2009 UT 41 ^ 11. 
49
 East Jordan, 860 P.2d at 312-13. Even so, shareholders still retain the right to petition 
companies to file change applications, a right companies can refuse only on specific and difficult 
to meet standards. East Jordan, 860 P.2d at 315-16; Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3.5. 
50
 East Jordan, 860 P.2d at 312-13. East Jordan's focus on collectivization resulted in what some 
perceived to be nonsensical results. The East Jordan dissent noted that demurring to 
collectivization made an arbitrary distinction as to what shareholders can do with their water 
once it is delivered to them, especially when it allowed any use below the diversion point but 
restricted use above that point. East Jordan, 860 P.2d at 319-20 (Durham, J., dissenting). 
"Syrette Tropic <&E. Fork Irr. Co., 89 P.2d 474,475 (Utah 1939); Bairdv. Upper Canal Irr. Co., 257 
P. 1060,1066 (Utah 1927); Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 167 P. 660, 662 (Utah 1917). 
52
 2003 UT 56, 8 2 P . 3 d l l l 9 . 
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between a lessee of water and its owner. A lessee has a right that in time will terminate. An 
owner, the lessor, does not. Recognizing this temporal horizon, this Court ruled in Prisbrey 
that a lessee may not file change applications, since allowing him to do so would derogate the 
rights of the owner.53 
Prisbrey concluded that one who has a temporary right cannot apply for a permanent 
change. It echoes the reasoning in East Jordan that a subordinate water user (e.g., a 
shareholder) can push to the boundaries of its use as long as superior water users are not 
harmed.54 Nowhere does it state that ownership or appropriator status is required to be a 
user of water under section 73-3-3. 
The district court read Prisbrey to hold that only an original appropriator of a water 
right may file a change application. Strawberry High Une Canal Co. v. Bureau of Reclamation^ 
confirmed that Prisbrey cannot be read so narrowly, and rather views users such as Big Ditch 
as equitable owners of water whose entidement was sufficient to file a change application.56 
Strawberry thus repudiates the district court's reading of Prisbrey. 
Strawberry reflects that neither Prisbrey nor East Jordan require ownership or 
appropriator status to have an entidement to use water. In Strawberry, the United States 
53
 Id \ 24. 
54
 See East Jordan, 860 P.2d at 315-16 (shareholders wrongfully barred from filing change 
applications may sue). 
55
 2006 UT 19,133P.3d410. 
56
 Strawberry noted that Prisbrey should not be read outside of its context as a lessor/lessee case, 
and then clarified that 'Prisbrey should not be read as undermining the importance of use as a 
basis for filing a change application under Utah's statutory scheme." Strawberry, 2006 UT 19 at 
ffif 39-40 (emphasis supplied). 
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initially appropriated water, then accepted applications from homesteaders to use the water. 
The approved applications meant the homesteaders were "entitled" to a certain quantity of 
water "in perpetuity."57 Later the association filed change applications, and the United States 
protested, claiming ownership. The association countered, claiming equitable title. The 
United States responded that the association had no right to file change applications on a 
mere contract right, a contract right that to date it had not fully beneficially used. 
This Court disagreed with the United States, stating that the parties had jointly 
secured a certificate of appropriation. The court compared the United States to an irrigation 
company that holds water rights in trust for those who beneficially use them. It also 
specifically rejected any attempt to use Utah water jurisprudence, specifically East Jordan, as a 
sword against water users rather than as a shield to protect them.58 The Court then chided 
the United States for attempting to use Prisbrey to defeat the association's claims.59 
The Court went on to rule that the government could not act in derogation of the 
rights of the water users association, which in turn had specific fiduciary and contractual 
obligations to its shareholders.60 The obligations of an exchange partner, like SLC here, are 
no less onerous. Indeed, they are augmented by the partner's obligation to approach the 
contract in good faith and with fair dealing. 
Considering the full spectrum of East Jordan, Prisbrey, and Strawberry, being a water 
57
 Id ^16. 
58
 Id U 37. 
59Id fl|[ 39-40. 
60
 Id 1(43. 
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user, even without being a water owner, still matters. There are times when that use is 
subsumed to other competing interests (East Jordan: collectivization, Prisbrej. lease 
termination), but, overall, one with an entidement to use may file change applications, even 
though ownership may be clouded or uncertain.61 
Big Ditch has the right to file change applications, even if it is not deemed an 
"appropriator."62 As noted, appropriator status is not what matters; right to use matters. 
Not only is Big Ditch virtually identical with the association in Strawberry; SLC is directly 
analogous to the United States. SLC, like the United States, claims to be the nominal owner 
of the water, and thus claims the exclusive right to control change applications. In doing so 
SLC ignores Big Ditch's right in perpetuity to water delivery, in a fixed amount tied to creek 
flows, and for any beneficial use. 
Strawberry shows that use matters, not arcane determinations of appropriator status. 
61
 East Jordan was partially legislatively overruled by Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3.5, which codified 
and clarified shareholders' rights vis-a-vis companies. East Jordan's predecessors and progeny 
reflect the reality that East Jordan is a collectivization cul-de-sac on the spectrum of defining 
entitlement to the use of water. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 749-50 (Utah 
1996); Consolidated Peoples Ditch Co. v. Foothill Ditch Co., 205 Cal. 54, 269 P. 915, 920-21 (1928) 
{quoted in East Jordan, 860 P.2d at 315 (allowing individual change applications from shareholders 
would "result in a state of inextricable discord and confusion among the owners of water rights 
of various sorts . . . .")). 
62Alternatively, Big Ditch might still retain appropriator status. SLC did not acquire Big Ditch's 
priority status of appropriator through the contract, inasmuch as the contract did not represent 
a reappropriation of the canyon water. SLC understood this in Progress. Had SLC been able to 
stand on its own status as appropriator, there would have been no need to stand in Big Ditch's 
shoes in Progress to assert priority, nor to require Big Ditch to appear in the case and defend, with 
SLC, that priority. Moreover, the existence of the reversion right demonstrates that Big Ditch's 
appropriator status has been left intact, irrespective of the realignment of its diversion rights via 
the 1905 contract. Just like the association members in Strawberry, Big Ditch's role as a 
"participant!] in the appropriation process" confers upon it the right to file change applications, 
irrespective of Big Ditch's subordinate contractual status to SLC. Strawberry, 2006 UT19 at ^ f 40. 
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Ironically, SLC has already acknowledged this in prior litigation, most notably in the 1993 
water rights hearing where it unequivocally claimed that title was immaterial to its right to file 
change applications under the statute. R. 5856, 5891, 5894. Appropriator status is an (not the) 
indicium of entitlement. As a contract water user, Big Ditch has all the indicia of ownership 
of water as would an original appropriator, except the right to dictate which molecules of 
water flow into its diversion structure. This distinguisher is insufficient to strip Big Ditch of 
its right to file change applications. 
The ultimate issue, never addressed by the district court, is whether SLC has veto 
power over Big Ditch's change application rights. The contract is integrated and 
unambiguous: once SLC delivers water to Big Ditch, Big Ditch is free to use it as it sees fit. 
This does not frustrate the contract's purpose. Analogously, even a post-East Jordan 
shareholder has such a right,63 since an irrigation company has no absolute veto power over a 
shareholder's petition to file a change application. SLC, like an irrigation company, can 
obstruct its contractual partner's right only by showing harm to its contractual rights, which 
it has not done, and cannot do.64 
Indeed, unlike a company and its shareholders, which are competing for one pot of 
water, here there are two pots of water, SLC's, and Big Ditch's. Absent collectivi2ation and 
scarcity, SLC has no basis to claim control of Big Ditch's exchange water, and certainly can 
^Bairdv. Upper Canal Irrigation Co., 257 P. 1060,1065 (Utah 1927), cited in East Jordan, 860 P.2d 
at 319 (Durham, J., dissenting). 
64SLC never adduced any evidence of how Big Ditch filing change applications would impede 
its contractual duties or impede its rights to take water from the canyon. This lack of harm is 
further discussed in the estoppel discussion below. 
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show no harm or frustration of contractual intent from what Big Ditch does with its water 
once it is diverted. 
The contract mandates that the parties are now and in perpetuity entitled to their full 
call of water.65 Big Ditch's entitlement to file change applications is both contractually 
required and good public policy. Allowing Big Ditch to file change applications allows it to 
respond to urbanization and continue to use its water beneficially. Clearly, it can do so, 
given that SLC has always been prepared to deliver, and has delivered, its full contractual 
obligation to Big Ditch, regardless of Big Ditch's historical call.66 
Ultimately, this case concerns boundaries on the free transferability of water for 
beneficial use. This Court prefers liberal transferability. It prevents urbanizing irrigation 
companies from dying, and it allows water to be beneficially used. Title is not dispositive. 
Use is. 
II. NEITHER ESTOPPEL NOR MODIFICATION HAVE REDUCED THE 
CITY'S CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS. 
I Salt Lake City has relied on this [conversion from agricultural uses to residential and 
commercial development of] east bench lands as it developed the systems needed to meet 
the growing demand for culinary quality water. . . . [EJssentially all of SLC's water resource 
J planning, including the maintenance of the pump stations and canals utilized to deliver the 
I exchange water, has been based on the reduction in the amount of water necessary to meet 
65
 This right is virtually identical to that of Genola Town in Genola v. Santaquin, 80 P.2d 930,934-
35 (Utah 1938). 
66
 Big Ditch adduced evidence below that SLC has not traditionally used all of its contract water, 
and has substantially more water than it requires. The scope and breadth of SLC's overallocation 
of water was specifically alleged in Big Ditch's first and second amended counterclaims, R. 251, 
1109, is documented in its expert affidavits, R. 3193, 3376, and is discussed in the antitrust 
section below. 
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I the combined irrigation needs under the 32 exchange agreements. Restoring the original 
capacity of the pump plants and canals would be extremely expensive and would, in my 
I" opinion, be a waste of public money since the original amount of water required by the combined exchange agreements could not be beneficially used on the lands served by those systems 
J —Affidavit of Jeffry Niermeyer, One-year Director of Public Utilities, Salt Lake City, 
December 3, 2008 R 5311-12 
SLC has consciously maintained the physical capacity to deliver to individual exchange 
partners the full amount of water mentioned in the Exchange Agreements in order to avoid 
the possible claim of default until SLCs current obligation is adjudicated. 
—Affidavit of Leroy Hooton, 27-year Former Director of Public Utilities, Salt Lake 
City, January 23, 2009 R 6064 
Under SLCs exchange agreements, we are required to deliver as much water today as 80 
years ago 
-Memorandum of Leroy Hooton to Mayor Deedee Corradini, February 16, 1996 R 
5840 
SLCs obligation to deliver exchange water has not lessened since that first exchange 
agreement in 1888 . . . 
—Leroy Hooton, An AWWA landmark: The Jordan and Salt "Lake Canal, September 17, 
1993 R 5911 
After the district court initially rejected SLCs incredible shrinking contract 
interpretation,67 SLC argued that its delivery obligations had been largely eliminated, either 
through modification to the contract or through equitable estoppel. As the contrasting 
statements above show, SLC struggled to articulate this change Estoppel required SLC to 
show reasonable detrimental reliance on Big Ditch's conduct Modification required 
evidence that could defeat an integrated writing. 
6
 1st Niermeyer Aff., Ex. E, ^ 9, 11, 14. The district court ruled that the contract was 
integrated, and nothing in the contract language suggested diminution, restriction to type of use, 
or restriction to place of use R. 349-79 
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Big Ditch requested evidence of SLC's claimed reliance and documentation of 
modification. There was none. Once this scarcity surfaced, Big Ditch moved for summary 
judgment, accepting arguendo SLC's inadequate discovery responses and asserting SLC could 
not prove estoppel or modification. SLC cross-moved. 
The parties' burdens were dissimilar. Big Ditch assumed SLC's stated facts arguendo 
only for purposes of its motion (and only conditionally if they were deemed admissible). 
The facts, Big Ditch argued, could not support SLC's claims of estoppel or modification. 
Big Ditch also showed that those facts, if used offensively by SLC, were either inadmissible 
or disputed. SLC's main witness, Mr. Niermeyer, was a City employee. His evidence changed 
as SLC's theories changed. These flip-flops, together with Mr. Niermeyer's inherent bias, 
prompted Big Ditch to move to strike his statements as incredible, self-serving, internally 
inconsistent, and legally conclusory. R. 408, 477. The district court denied the motion, and 
consequently relied on Mr. Niermeyer's statements to make its ultimate conclusions that SLC 
had demonstrated detrimental reliance. 
The district court implicitly resolved the factual disputes regarding Mr. Niermeyer's 
inconsistencies and credibility. It also resolved the far more serious dispute between Mr. 
Niermeyer's statement that SLC had changed its delivery capacity by relying on diminished 
calls, and the directly contrasting statement made by Mr. Niermeyer's predecessor, Mr. Leroy 
Hooton, highlighted above. 
Apart from its self-serving factual foundation, SLC's estoppel and modification 
claims were SLC's already-rejected contractual intent arguments, dressed in equitable clothes. 
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SLC's "evidence" was based on contractual language that SLC claimed limited the place and 
use of exchange water, and was further based on a very narrow reading of contractual 
language that the district court had already rejected. 
On the issue of equitable estoppel, the district court ruled that Big Ditch made 
decades of diminishing calls, and that even though SLC may have "reached certain legal 
conclusions concerning its obligations to Big Ditch under the 1905 Agreement," these played 
a "minor role in terms of reliance." R. 6341. The district court ruled further that "virtually 
all" of SLC's planning activity was predicated on Big Ditch's diminished calls. R. 6342. 
This result errs on a number of fronts: 
1. It impermissibly confused the standards of estoppel with those of waiver. 
2. It concluded that Big Ditch's use could only be for irrigation in the Big Ditch service 
area, a conclusion related to the district court's contemporaneous conclusion that Big 
Ditch lacked sufficient entidement to use its contractual water elsewhere, for other 
purposes. 
3. It resolved factual disputes surrounding SLC's use, and ignored the fact that SLC had 
always been able to deliver Big Ditch's water continuously since the execution of the 
contract. 
4. It assumed that SLC's devising of legal contingency plans was reliant conduct. 
Reasonable reliance requires a good faith belief in facts that define one's duty. One 
with such a belief does not devise legal contingencies based on alternate facts. 
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5. It ignored evidence demonstrating that reasonable detrimental reliance was legally 
impossible, and that SLC could point to no specific reliant conduct. 
A. The District Court Applied the Wrong Standard of Proof and Confused 
Estoppel with Waiver. 
The elements of estoppel are "first, 'a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by 
one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted'; next, 'reasonable action or inaction by the 
other party taken or not taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or 
failure to act'; and, third, 'injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first 
party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act.'"68 Estoppel 
is a disfavored remedy.69 "Equitable estoppel is intended to prevent a party from taking 
unconscionable advantage of its own wrong by asserting its strict legal rights."70 The 
wrongdoing of the estopped party is highly relevant. Failure to collect what one is owed the 
"wrongdoing" of the collector.71 
While Utah courts have never directly addressed the standard of proof for estoppel, 
clear and convincing evidence is the majority view.72 In Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & 
Loan Association, the court discussed the requirement of a distinct intent to prove a waiver or 
68
 Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, \ 14, 158 P.3d 1088. 
69
 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel & Waiver § 3; see generally 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel <& Waiver § 30. 
70
 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel & Waiver §30. 
71
 Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226,1230-31 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(although landlord did not initially 
collect overdue rent and taxes, tenant was still obligated to pay the amount they contractually 
agreed to pay). 
72
 Kelly v. Wallace, 972 P.2d 1117,1123 (Mont. 1998) ("Equitable estoppel is not favored an will 
be sustained only upon clear and convincing evidence.") (citations omitted). 
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an estoppel.73 Soter's, Inc. implies a clear and convincing standard subsumed under the 
"distinct" requirement, albeit in dictum.74 
The district court compounded the error of applying the wrong standard of proof by 
confusing the requirements of waiver with those of estoppel The district court purported to 
focus on detrimental reliance (required for estoppel, but not for waiver). However, the lack 
of any evidence of reliance and factual disputes surrounding such reliance shows that the two 
standards were in fact confused. 
Waiver is not estoppel. Waiver is the knowing and intentional relinquishment of an 
existing right The intent must be distinct75 While one's failing to enforce an executory 
contract may amount to a waiver of the right to seek damages for past breaches, such 
conduct does not terminate the future right to enforce the contract76 Nor is the failure to 
collect the "wrongdoing" of the collector so as to trigger an equitable right in the other party 
to stop collection.77 
Waivers cannot reach into the future and defeat executory contractual rights. 
Estoppel can, but only upon a showing of reasonable detrimental reliance.78 A lessor's waiver 
73
 857 P.2d 935, 942 n.6 (Utah 1993). 
74
 Soter's Inc. }s requirement is consistent with the general rule that estoppel is a shield, not a 
sword. Youngblood, 2007 UT 28 at \ 19; see also 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel <& Waiver § 31. 
75
 Soter's, Inc., 857 P.2d at 942. 
76
 "A party may re-establish a condition or obligation that had been eliminated by waiver in the 
absence of an exchange of consideration or factors that support estoppel." J.K Hale Contracting 
Co. v. United N.M. Bank, 799 P.2d 581, 585 (N.M. 1990). 
77
 Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1230-31 (Utah Ct App. 1988). 
78
 Id.; 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 259. 
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of an escalation clause does not bar the lessor from prospectively enforcing it.79 In short, 
waiver can bar exercise of a one-time right. Estoppel can bar enforcing an executory right.80 
The "distinctly made" requirement mandates that waivers be express. An "implied" 
waiver (a waiver through conduct or silence), being conceptually identical with estoppel,81 
requires an independent reasonable belief leading to detrimental reliance. The relying party 
must reasonably believe in the legitimacy of the other party's representations. A waiver 
cannot create an estoppel; there must be, in addition to waiver conduct, an independent 
wrongdoing of the waiving party on which the wronged party can reasonably rely. Objective 
reasonability is required.82 
B. SLC Did Not Reasonably Detrimentally Rely on Big Ditch's 
Diminishing Water Call. 
79
 Barnes, 750 P.2d at 1230-31 (landlord still entitled to collect overdue rent or taxes). Or, a 
landlord may waive its right to prohibit a liquor store on its premises by idly standing by while 
the store is built. Carr-Gottstein Foods Co. v. Wasilla, LLC, 182 P.3d 1131 (Alaska 2008). With 
rent, the landlord is entitled to collect future rents, despite its past waiver. In the liquor store 
example, once the store is built and the waiver happens, the store remains as a monument to the 
landlord's inaction. 
80
 See 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 259. This is true whether a waiver is implied or 
express. An effective implied waiver must be reasonably relied on by the nonwaiving party, and 
is virtually identical with estoppel. Carr-Gottstein, 182 P.3d at 1139 & n.35. Carr-Gottstein, appears 
to depart from the Utah requirement that a waiver must be distinct. Nevertheless, its discussion 
focused on implied waiver, not express waiver, where distinctness becomes problematic in the 
act and in the proof. It supports the suggestion made in Soter's Inc. that with the "distinct" 
requirement, a clear and convincing burden of proof is appropriate. 
81
 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel & Waiver § 37. 
82
 Youngblood, 2007 UT 28 at ffi| 33-34. 
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SLC argued below that Big Ditch's silence, or conduct, changed its contractual 
obligations. This implied waiver/estoppel argument therefore required an independent 
reasonable belief leading to detrimental reliance, but SLC produced no such evidence. 
The district court ruled that "virtually all of SLC's planning with respect to its water 
resources, its changes in infrastructure and its dealings with others in trading irrigation rights 
for culinary water rights have been predicated on the reduction in the amount of water taken 
by Big Ditch." R. 6342. The district court made findings in reaching its decision, and those 
findings (so large that the district court declared that they entirely accounted for the 100 
years of City infrastructure) were largely inferred from a stunning paucity of evidence. On its 
face, it is absurd to declare that the conduct of a single exchange partner, out of 32 others, 
was the fulcrum on which turned a major city's development. Yet the statement is even 
more remarkable given the record in this matter, which is bereft of any specific evidence 
pinned to Big Ditch's conduct, and given the summary judgment standard, which requires all 
inferences to be made in favor of the nonmoving party. 
1. SLC Alleged an Arcane Usage Pattern in Arguing Harm, Ignoring 
That Big Ditch Wishes to File Change Applications, Not Return to 
1905 Practices. 
In Big Ditch's motion for summary judgment it accepted arguendo SLC's evidence of 
reliance because that evidence was inadequate.83 The district court, in contrast, used the 
evidence to resolve the matter for SLC. Even ignoring the already-addressed issue that the 
83
 This assumption was made only alternatively. R. 5402. Big Ditch raised a number of factual 
disputes regarding the evidence's credibility and consistency in opposing SLC's motion. R. 5402, 
5421. 
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district court resolved factual disputes in reaching its result, SLC's evidence was inadequate. 
SLC never showed it engaged in any reasonable reliance behavior. 
Mr. Niermeyer's two affidavits were key to SLC's arguments. In his first affidavit he 
argued that the 1905 contract had built into its language diminution based on restrictions on 
nature and/or place of use. It stated that SLC made huge infrastructure improvements 
based on SLC's "expectation and understanding of its obligations under the 1905 
agreement."84 Being text-based, this affidavit contained no actual evidence of reasonable 
detrimental reliance. 
An incorrect understanding of the law or of an integrated contract is not the 
representation of another party. Presumably, if diminution were the intent of the contract, 
SLC would have had this belief from the day of signing, and therefore it could not have been 
"induced" into such a belief by Big Ditch. Moreover, as a matter of law, there can be no 
misunderstanding of an integrated writing; by definition it is unambiguous and amenable to 
84First Niermeyer Aff., Ex. E, fflj 11,14. R. 349. In paragraph 11, SLC did not provide evidence 
of reasonable detrimental reliance, but merely recited urbanization trends and claimed that Big 
Ditch cannot take its full allotment of water at this time. SLC invoked restrictions on place and 
nature of use as informing its understanding of its obligations under the agreement. Next, in 
paragraph 14 the affidavit states that Big Ditch has gradually decreased its demand for irrigation 
water, and that this decrease was consistent with SLC's understanding of its obligations under 
the agreement. Not only is this irrelevant, but it does not constitute evidence of how SLC has 
actually reasonably detrimentally relied on Big Ditch's conduct. 
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only one construction.85 Furthermore, applicable law is incorporated into a contract, and as 
such a misunderstanding of the law is no basis for detrimental reliance.86 
After the district court rightfully rejected the arguments in the first affidavit, Mr. 
Niermeyer submitted a second affidavit in which he abandoned the text argument. But, like 
the first affidavit, the second affidavit embraces a theory that there are nature, place, and 
amount restrictions on SLC's obligations, now arising from Big Ditch's conduct rather than 
the contract text. 
Mr. Niermeyer merely avers that if Big Ditch were to suddenly make 1905-era 
requests for its water, delivered for irrigation in the historic Big Ditch service area, SLC 
might struggle to deliver the water. He fails to account for the event sparking the 
lawsuit—Big Ditch's filing change applications for use of water in other places and for other 
purposes. There is no evidence how the proposed change applications would harm SLC's 
ability to take creek water, or would affect SLC's method of delivering water to Big Ditch. 
SLC cited a litany of public works projects, but in doing so it continued to make its initial 
error of theorizing an impact on its infrastructure in the face of a fanciful 1905-era request to 
use all the water on the historical service area, and not from Big Ditch filing change 
applications. Moreover, it admitted it could not link any Big Ditch request with any 
85
 See Tangren v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, \ 12,182 P.3d 326; cf. Barnes, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). The district court ruled that the contract was integrated, a conclusion Big Ditch does not 
dispute. 
86
 Reed p. Union Cent Life Ins, Co., 61 P. 21,21 (Utah 1900); 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel & Waiver § 51. 
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particular impact on or harm to City resources.87 At best, SLC was inviting the district court 
to infer such harm, impermissible at summary judgment 
Of course, most striking is SLC's failure to keep its story straight, as highlighted 
above. Not only did conflict present an unresolvable factual dispute, but it showed that SLC 
did not reasonably believe that Big Ditch was limited in its call. Three times Mr. Hooton so 
stated. R. 5408-11, 5839-45, 5901-11. Mr. Hooton hopes for an adjudication to keep the 
exchange companies from exercising their full contractual exchange rights. R. 5839. This 
shows that SLC acknowledged its exchange obligations while investing millions in 
infrastructure, and then denies those obligations by circularly citing to the infrastructure. Mr. 
Hooton further admits that SLC believes it must deliver exchange water at full contract 
levels.88 Though not generated by SLC, the many years of neutral commissioners' reports 
representing to SLC that Big Ditch had a "Full Share Available" out of the Creek shows that 
SLC had notice that its obligation continued.89 
87
 SLC never produced evidence of how Big Ditch's change applications could harm it. Utah 
water policy encourages beneficial use as changes occur in populations. The final arbiter of 
potential harm caused by a Big Ditch change application is the State Engineer. SLC has shown 
no harm through past actions (which defeats SLC's estoppel claim), and can show no harm in 
the future (because the change application process protects it from such harm). Moreover, SLC 
has admitted it can deliver Big Ditch's full share of water. R. 5408-11, 5839-45, 5901-11, 6199. 
Big Ditch also adduced evidence below that, by any account, SLC has a great surplus of water. 
See, e.g. R. 473, 562, 6302. 
88R. 5842 Mr. Hooton echoed these thoughts at a symposium at which he was the keynote 
speaker. R. 5901-12. 
89
 SLC produced no evidence below that it disavowed or otherwise objected to these reports. 
R. 5499-5813. 
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This evidence demonstrates that SLC merely formed a legal theory as to its 
obligations, not based on any wrongdoing by Big Ditch, but by exercise of SLC's own legal 
skill in interpreting the contract. It did not reasonably factually rely; it legally opined. 
Estoppel does justice when a party makes an innocent factual misstep based on 
deception by another. A party that prepares legal contingency plans is not a deceived 
innocent. SLC has always been able to deliver Big Ditch's full contractual share, and never 
reasonably believed otherwise. A diminished delivery requirement was a possible outcome 
SLC stated it wished to legally advocate. But a diminished call was not something on which 
SLC could reasonably rely so as to equitably avoid the contract. 
SLC also did not show how Big Ditch's diminished calls were a but-for cause of its 
resource decisions. Estoppel requires that reliance be incompatible with the agreement as 
written.90 The types of things SLC has done—develop infrastructure, forge agreements, 
secure water rights—are things that cities normally do. None of this was inconsistent with 
past, present or future full and complete performance of the 1905 agreement It is not 
detrimentally reliant conduct. 
SLC admitted that it could not cite to any single action it took in response to Big 
Ditch's conduct R. 5311-12. Instead, it claims it acted as it did because all 32 of its exchange 
0
 "[C]onduct relied upon to establish estoppel must not otherwise be compatible with the 
agreement as written." Am. Prescription Plan, Inc. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 170 A.D.2d 471,472 
(N.Y.App. Div. 1991). 
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partners were reducing their calls. It cites no evidence as to how these other exchange 
contracts would or could somehow act as an ensemble to increase SLC's burden.91 
This ensemble argument made two erroneous assumptions. First, it improperly 
attributed features of other contracts to the 1905 contract. Because some of those contracts 
contained express limitations on nature or place of use, SLC assumed all exchange contracts 
did. Apart from these provisions' violating public policy favoring maximal beneficial use of 
water,92 this "everyone does it this way" argument led to a second erroneous assumption: 
that every company might try, en masse, to not do it this way and restore their calls to historic 
91
 On the other hand, at least three of the cited exchange contracts do contain express restrictions 
on nature and place of use. R. 5310, 5403-04. This validated the district court's early ruling that 
no such restrictions existed in the Big Ditch contract, and vitiates the district court's later change 
of heart. Furthermore, the mass call SLC fears is fiction. SLC has reduced its delivery 
obligations to the 32 exchange partners over the last 50 years. SLC, for example, has adopted 
a strategy in its watershed management plan to eliminate exchange contracts entirely, either by 
acquiring shares or, more disturbingly, driving its exchange partners out of business. R. 4268-72, 
4275, 6293-6323. SLC has been successfully implementing this plan. R. 4888-4930 (City buys 
out Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch's right to transfer water from historic service area, which 
reduced City's exchange obligation); R. 6294. See also R. 2595,2974, 3072-78, 3080,6294,6296, 
6305,6302,499,501,503,4274-75,5840,6290,6322. Big Ditch requested that the district court 
consider evidence of this conduct as part of a plenary record review connected with SLC's 
motion for summary judgment on title, R. 4034, a requirement imposed by Rule 56(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court ignored these facts, either by striking the 
Garside affidavit to which SLC-authored documents asserting the facts were attached, or by 
essentially resolving them in SLC's favor and making inferences in favor of SLC, not Big Ditch. 
92
 See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3.5; see also East Jordan, 860 P.2d at 316 n.24; Syrett, 89 P.2d at 475-
76; Baird, 257 P. at 1065-66 (cited in East Jordan, 860 P.2d at 316 n.24). These cases reflect that 
beneficial use of water should be made and continued. Likewise, SLC is equitably barred from 
claiming that its contracting partner cannot beneficially use its water. Campbell v. Nunn, 2 P.2d 
899, 901 (Utah 1931). 
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levels.93 This argument ignored disparities among those contracts and made inferences 
(inappropriate at summary judgment) as to whether such a call was now even possible.94 
SLC could not show reasonable detrimental reliance. It admitted that it could deliver 
Big Ditch's full contractual allotment. It admitted that rather than believing it had a 
diminished obligation, it opined that it "should" have such a legal obligation. SLC cannot 
invoke equity simply because it has embraced a legal position. 
Even if the inconsistent Niermeyer and Hooton affidavits were credible, and SLC 
could show nature and use restrictions prevented it from delivering the old levels of 
exchange water, SLC could still show no impairment. If it is now difficult to deliver the 
water required by the contract, the remedy is simple: don't deliver the water. The contract 
allows SLC to make that choice, thereby removing any impairment. Of course, under this 
scenario Big Ditch gets to exercise its reversionary rights under the contract, but this is what 
SLC bargained for in the first place. In other words, there can be no prejudice if SLC no 
longer has to comply with the contract. However, SLC cannot expect to both be excused 
from the contract and keep the ongoing payments (creek water) required under the contract. 
93
 If SLC made these assumptions, did it ever intend to honor the agreement as written? The 
Big Ditch contract was negotiated as it was despite being different from other contracts, and 
with the knowledge that the full share was required to be available. 
94Among those inferences was the reasonability of SLC's reliance. Generally, the reasonability 
of a belief is a fact question. Ilottv. Univ. of Utah, 2000 UT App 286, ^  18. The district court did 
not address the reasonability of SLC's belief, focusing instead exclusively on SLC's reliance. 
Reasonability was implicit in the district court's finding of reliance and conclusion of estoppel. 
The district court thus implicitly resolved factual disputes surrounding SLC's reasonability 
(despite Big Ditch's arguments to the contrary). 
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SLC's retooling argument, and therefore its alleged harm, presuppose 1905 place and 
nature of use restrictions. These restrictions violate public policy. As already noted, an 
implicit restriction in a water exchange contract on place or nature of use (absent 
demonstrated impairment to an interested party) contravenes Utah law The opposite policy 
controls. Beneficial use is the measure of water rights in Utah, and the freedom to use water 
rights for different uses and in different places is the heart of that policy. 
The importance of this public policy is magnified when applied to irrigation 
companies. SLC used Big Ditch's status as an irrigation company to justify Big Ditch's death 
through urbanization. Irrigation companies, by their nature, must evolve to meet the 
changing needs of their shareholders. Urbanization should not be, and is not, fatal to an 
irrigation company. Companies, through change applications, are able to allow their 
shareholders to respond to development demands. Big Ditch, by filing change applications, 
was simply preserving beneficial use through flexibly meeting development demand. SLC 
asks of the 1905 contract: "How in the world can we deliver corn to your cows now that the 
buggy roads are gone?" Big Ditch responds: "Use a semi and take it to the ethanol plant." 
C. The Exchange Contract Was Not Modified by the Parties' Conduct. 
The district court had ruled previously, citing Tangren v. Tangren^ that the parties' 
course of performance96 did not affect the interpretation of the contract, since the contract is 
integrated. R. 3353. In its July 2009 ruling, the district court reversed itself, stating that the 
parties' "historical conduct" showed that they modified the 1905 contract agreement to inject 
952008 UT 20. 
96Or course of dealing (SLC intermixed the terms in the first instance). 
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into it a diminution component, irrespective of the statute of frauds requirement that 
modifications be written. 
The ruling violates Tangren. The parties' conduct in the performance of an integrated 
agreement is irrelevant. The document's integration bars conduct evidence under the parol 
evidence rule and the statute of frauds. Yet the district court not only admitted this 
evidence, but, as noted above, also ignored factual disputes concerning whether SLC was 
entitled to rely on it. The district court relied on estoppel to bar Big Ditch from raising the 
statute of frauds, the same estoppel used to bar Big Ditch from enforcing the contract as 
written. In so doing the district court again resolved factual disputes and made inferences 
adverse to Big Ditch. 
To show a modification, SLC needed to avoid the statute of frauds. Under the 
doctrine of partial performance, it had to show by clear and convincing evidence that Big 
Ditch partially performed the modified agreement, and that SLC reasonably detrimentally 
relied on that perfomance.97 In ruling for SLC, the district court articulated the wrong legal 
standard. It raised estoppel as a defense to the statute. However, "estoppel" is not a defense 
to the statute of frauds. The statute can be defeated only through a number of specifically 
articulated and old common law defenses, among them partial performance. 
The district court missed this point. It created a new garden-variety estoppel 
exception to the statute of frauds to avoid the strict requirements partial performance 
'Bamberger Co. v. Certified Prods., 48 P.2d 489, 492 (Utah 1935). 
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imposed. Its decision even goes so far to distinguish its new-found exception.98 The district 
court erred. In its effort to create new law, it was citing language from a partial performance 
case." Yet it jettisoned partial performance's requirement of exclusive referability.100 This 
contrived standard was incorrect. Partial performance is the only viable exception to the 
statute. Partial performance evidence must be strong, and be "acts-oriented rather than 
word-oriented."101 Most important, those acts must be "exclusively referable" to the 
modified contract.102 
SLC claimed that the contract was modified so as to reflect diminishing calls. While 
SLC's acts of partial performance were, presumably, modifying its infrastructure, it admitted 
that it had no evidence tying its allegedly reliant conduct to Big Ditch's actions, and further 
admitted that it has always been able to deliver Big Ditch's full share of water. SLC's 
conduct is referable to its own prudent planning, not a modified contract. 
98Invoking "estoppel," the district court did wish to "delve into" partial performance. R. 6343. 
The district court accepted Big Ditch's contention that the contract was covered by the statute 
of frauds. Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-5-1 to 25-5-9; see, e.g., Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, 44 P.3d 742 
(overruled on other grounds by Tangren v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20,182 P.3d 326). The district court 
focused on barring Big Ditch from enforcing the statute, not the statute's legal applicability. 
99
 That is, Bamberger Bamberger also recognized that it was operating within one of the 
commonly-recognized exceptions to the statute. Bamberger, 48 P.2d at 491-92. 
100Ironically, even though the district court's new exception to the statute was legally fictitious, 
SLC still failed to meet it. For the same reasons it failed to show estoppel to impose diminution, 
SLC failed to demonstrate, with clear and convincing evidence, reasonable detrimental reliance. 
101
 Spears, 2002 UT 24 at \ 24. 
102
 Id. 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN MAKING VARIOUS EVIDENTIARY 
AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS. 
The striking of the Christensen affidavits was error. He was Big Ditch's expert, and 
his opinions directly related to Big Ditch's entitlement arguments in its fixed quantity and 
tide motions. The district court's reasoning reveals its error: it merely stated that the record 
was already large and that Mr. Christensen's affidavit would be "unnecessary and unhelpful," 
R. 4835, a direct and ambiguous quote from SLC's opposition to the affidavits. R. 4361. 
The district court erred. It first purported to engage in an admissibility analysis, but cited no 
rule supporting its conclusion. The affidavits were submitted in support of Big Ditch's 
summary judgment motions and to rebut the City's affidavits. Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure requires denials of rule 56 motions based on multiple grounds to articulate 
the grounds for denial. A fortiori this principle applies to striking documents in support of 
Rule 56 motions.103 Relatedly, evidentiary rulings require citation to the evidentiary standard 
that informed the district court's discretion.104 
The district court also purported to engage in a timeliness analysis, stating that there 
was no way to submit further affidavits once briefing had closed. This issue has not been 
addressed by this Court since Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6 was amended. The rule once 
allowed the filing of affidavits up to the day before the hearing.105 Big Ditch candidly 
103In its oppositions, SLC stated several grounds for relief. R. 3250, R. 4360. 
104
 Rule 103(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence requires a definitive statement on the record 
about why the evidence was excluded. 
105
 Until April 1, 2004, Rule 6(d) stated: "When a motion is support by affidavit, the affidavit 
shall be served with the motion; and, except as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing 
affidavits may be served not later than 1 day before the hearing, unless the court permits them 
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acknowledged the new rule's silence on timing, and invited the district court to clarify, yet 
still admit the affidavit. R. 3186. Instead, the district court treated Big Ditch's candor as an 
admission that there was no legal basis to allow the affidavits. This Court has now ruled that 
it is not necessary to submit all supporting documentation together with the opening 
memorandum, and this reasoning supports Big Ditch's approach below.106 The district court 
erred.107 
Big Ditch strongly objected to the final order prepared by SLC. The order eliminated 
anything favorable to Big Ditch, expanded the district court's memorandum decision, and 
sanitized inconsistencies in the district court's reasoning. Most alarming was the order's 
to be served at some other time." 
106
 Clegg v. Wasatch County, 2010 UT 5 at If 31. 
107
 Similarly, the Garside Affidavit, R. 481, was improperly excluded. The district court claimed 
the affidavit was offered for antitrust, rather than the basis claimed by Big Ditch (lack of 
impairment), R. 2945, and then used the erroneous basis to exclude it. Moreover, it only 
partially excluded it, and did not articulate which part. SLC, in contrast to Big Ditch, succeeded 
in getting in its key affidavits (those of Mr. Niermeyer), R. 2945, 6324, despite the fact that they 
were largely argument, were legal conclusion, and lacked foundation. See Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 
P.2d 97, 103 (Utah 1992)(expert affidavits have heightened foundational requirements). 
Moreover, Mr. Niermeyer improperly relied on a summary of business records without making 
available the originals, Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), and 
his summary was inadmissible because it was not kept in the ordinary course of business (it was 
prepared solely for litigation). See Shurtleffv. Jay Tuft <& Co,, 622 P.2d 1168,1173-74 (Utah 1980). 
The district court cited Mr. Niermeyer's" institutional knowledge" as foundation, even though 
the affidavit cites "personal knowledge" and possession of City records for foundation. R. 349-
50. Wisely so, since there is no such thing as "institutional knowledge" as a foundational basis. 
Rather, it arises in banking cases, e.g., United States Bank Nat'I Ass'n v. HMA, L.C, 2007 UT 40, 
|^ 12,169 P.3d 433; and fourth amendment cases, e.g., United States v. Adkins, 169 Fed. Appx. 961, 
967 (6th Cir. Ky. 2006). Even if applicable, institutional knowledge requires active seeking of 
information, Davis v. Dept. of Justice, 460 F.3d 92, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2006), not merely Mr. 
Niermeyer's exercising "custody and control of SLC records" (he never once avers he reviewed 
any of the records under his control). 
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twisting of the memorandum decision's mandate: "the Court. . . does not decide the more 
specific question of the precise amount of water which SLC is now obligated to deliver." R. 
6344. By definition, imposing place and use restrictions defines Big Ditch's rights with a 
precision the district court eschewed. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING BIG DITCH'S 
ANTITRUST COUNTERCLAIM. 
The district court acted on the wrong counterclaim when it dismissed the appellants' 
antitrust counterclaim. With respect to Big Ditch,108 there were substantial changes that 
insulated it from the alleged weaknesses cited by the district court.109 Big Ditch sought 
permission to file a second amended counterclaim to further address those alleged 
weaknesses. It showed that SLC was an aggressive water market player far exceeding its role 
as a supplier to its citizens. It alleged water "banking", "surplus" sales that annually generate 
millions in revenue for SLC, and acquiring large numbers of water shares to control both 
companies and water beyond its present or foreseeable needs. R. 1126. While abuse of 
discretion is the standard of review for motions to amend, denying such motions is 
disfavored,110 especially here where it is filed early in the litigation.111 
108The shareholders treat their counterclaims' dismissal in their brief, here incorporated by 
reference. 
109The district court found that Big Ditch failed to allege that SLC competed with Big Ditch in 
the same relevant marketplace, and that allegations of unilateral action were fatal to the antitrust 
claims. The district court erred: Big Ditch demonstrated at length the specificity of its 
allegations, R. 109-22, and also showed that unilateral conduct is sufficient to state a claim for 
violation of the act. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-914(2) (2007). 
110
 Timm, 851 P.2d at 1183. Dismissing without leave to amend is highly disfavored. 
Intermountain Physical Medicine Assocs. v. Micro-Dex Corp., 739 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987); Ro/o v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 654 (3d Cir. 1998). Motions to 
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Apart from misconstruing antitrust law in assessing Big Ditch's counterclaims, the 
district court also misapplied the exception that antitrust law creates for municipalities. The 
Utah Antitrust Act does not apply to "the activities of a municipality to the extent authorized 
or directed by state law."112 The exception applies only "when the anticompetitive conduct 
alleged by the plaintiff 'is a foreseeable result' of a state's grant of authority in a particular 
area." Id. It is not enough for the municipality to simply act pursuant to a statute.113 
The district court ruled that SLC's water banking and surplus sales were a foreseeable 
result of its compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-14, which allows extraterritorial surplus 
sales. Yet Big Ditch's allegations show that SLC's conduct goes far beyond the scope of the 
statute, and is not a foreseeable result of it.114 The district court further erred by relying on 
section 10-7-4(1) of the Utah Code, which allows municipalities to purchase water. This is 
not a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed . . . state policy" to displace 
competition.115 
dismiss should not be granted without giving the losing party leave to amend. See Helfv. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., 2009 UT 11, \ 15, 203 P.3d 962. 
111
 The second amended complaint was filed on March 4, 2008, very early in discovery and only 
four months after the initial dismissal. 
112
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-915(l)(f); see Summit Water Distrib. Co. v. Summit County, 2005 UT 73, 
f 14, 123 P.3d 437 (a party is only exempt if it is a "municipality" and its actions are also 
"authorized or directed by state law"). 
113
 W. If 41. 
114
 County Water Sys., Inc. v. Salt Lake City, 278 P.2d 285, 290 (Utah 1954). 
115
 Summit Water Distrib. Co., 2005 UT 73 at ffij 36, 45. Even if SLC's actions were "authorized 
or directed by state law," SLC's actions would still not be exempt from the Utah Antitrust Act 
because SLC is acting as a market participant, rather than as a "municipality." Id. at |^ 46 n. 10 
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Finally, the district court erred because the "municipality exception" is an affirmative 
defense, with the burden squarely on SLC, yet SLC submitted no evidence justifying the 
application of this defense.116 The district court also failed to stricdy, and narrowly, construe 
the law against SLC, as required.117 
CONCLUSION 
SLC wishes to restrict Big Ditch to 1905 uses. By doing so, it threatens Big Ditch's 
very survival (SLC's ultimate goal). While SLC may argue that Big Ditch's death was written 
into the contract, or that Big Ditch has invited death through its conduct, equity demands 
otherwise. Equity demands that if two parties enter into a mutually beneficial water 
exchange, both parties should get their full benefit of the bargain. Big Ditch has perpetually 
and continuously honored its agreement with SLC; equity demands the same of SLC. 
This Court should confirm that Big Ditch's perpetual right to the use of water under 
the 1905 contract is a water entidement sufficient to meet the requirements of section 73-3-
3. Big Ditch should have access to the water transfer process. Further, both SLC and Big 
Ditch mutually should be entided to their respective full fixed amounts under the exchange. 
The district court should be reversed, with summary judgment being entered in favor 
of Big Ditch's entitlement so it may file change applications on its water in the full 
contractual amount contemplated by the contract's language. Its antitrust claims should also 
be reinstated. Only this result can restore the rights Big Ditch bargained for 105 years ago. 
116
 See id. at Iff 47-48. 
117
 Id. at % 29. 
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